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No one has done more in this generation to rehabilitate free will than Robert Kane
(Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin). Calling his position “free willist”—an expression
borrowed from William James—Kane develops a nuanced theory of free will while engaging the
best contemporary theorists in balanced argument. Throughout the book, but especially in the
concluding chapter, Kane reflects on the implications of his theory for ethics, political
philosophy, and cosmology.
Although the question of free will is ancient and takes many forms, Kane finds the key to
contemporary debates in an exchange between John Bramhall and Thomas Hobbes in the 1650s.
Bramhall claimed that free will and determinism are antithetical. Hobbes countered that these are
“confused and empty” words. It is confused to identify free will with indeterminism; on the other
hand, talk of the self determining itself is empty since it involves appeal to obscure forms of
agency. For Hobbes, persons are self-determining when nothing prevents them from doing what
they intend or desire to do. This sort of freedom, however, does not require that their intentions
or desires be uncaused—hence, its name, compatibilist freedom. With some notable exceptions
(e.g. Reid, Kant, Lequyer, Kierkegaard, James, Hartshorne, Sartre), philosophers have sided with
Hobbes.
Kane agrees that free will is not the same as indeterminism. Although the Epicureans
made room for free will by postulating a chance “swerve” in the atoms, it is a mistake to equate
freedom with mere randomness. Kane also concedes that there are significant kinds of
freedom—freedoms “worth wanting” in the words of Daniel Dennett—even in a deterministic
world. Nevertheless, he takes Bramhall’s side insofar as he claims that there is a significant kind
of freedom that is incompatible with determinism. Kane defines free will as “the power of agents
to be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes” (4). He
maintains that if this sort of freedom exists then some of our decisions are not made inevitable by
antecedent causes.
Some of the clearest examples where free will may be exercised are situations in which
one is torn between alternatives, each of which recommends itself, but for incommensurable sets
of reasons. In these situations, Kane argues, one’s choice is undetermined because the effort
involved in adjudicating the inner conflict is indeterminate. One’s prior character and motives
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explain both the effort one makes and why it is an effort; but they do not completely explain the
choice one makes. One’s choice initiates a “value experiment” whose justification lies in the
future (145). Kane marks this as “the essence of free will” (208). He defends the intelligibility of
this picture by arguing that, whichever choice one makes, it is one’s own, it is rational, and it is
under one’s control.
Kane advances beyond armchair theorizing while always remaining sensitive to the
philosophical dimensions of the debate. This differentiates his discussion from so many other
treatments of free will by philosophers and scientists. He adheres to what he calls “the free
agency principle,” a methodological rule that prevents one from postulating special kinds of
entities or forms of causation that are not required for agency in general (116). In other words,
incompatibilist and compatibilist theories of free will should be on the same ontological footing.
The implication of the free agency principle for Kane’s theory is clear: if free choices are
undetermined by antecedent causes, then the atoms must somewhere “swerve,” and they must
swerve in the places where it matters, i.e. in the brain (17). Kane proposes, as a working
hypothesis, that “indeterminate efforts of will are complex chaotic processes in the brain,
involving neural networks that are globally sensitive to quantum indeterminacies at the neuronal
level” (130). If this is correct, then micro-indeterminacies in the brain are amplified to the
macro-level. What an agent experiences within him/herself as an effort of will, an external
observer, in examining the agent’s brain, would find indeterminate processes.
Two welcome consequences of Kane’s theory are that it sidesteps the simplistic
dichotomy of nature vs. nurture and it avoids the extremes of unqualified determinism and
radical freedom of the will. Free will, as Kane conceives it, is conditioned, hemmed about by
circumstances, and subject to degrees (213). This opens up such questions as how much free will
we have, how widespread it is, and at what developmental stages it begins to exist. These are
some of the passages in the labyrinth of free will that Kane leaves unexplored (5). One may
thank him nonetheless for laying the groundwork that makes such questions theoretically
intelligible.

